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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN F. NIELSEN and ALTAR. 
NIELSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
W. R. RUCKER and ADDIE W. 
RUCKER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8817 
Although the respondents do not seriously disagree 
with the statement of facts set out in the appellants' brief 
they believe it to be inadequate to illustrate the background 
of the issues in this case. Appellants reluctance to refer 
to a record that does not support their contentions is under-
standable. Respondents, therefore, will relate the facts in 
more complete detail. 
Prior to the 14th of March, 1957, the respondents own-
ed a dairy farm located approximately three miles north of 
Brigham City, Utah. This farm, together with 77 head of 
dairy stock and equipment thereon, had been listed with 
the Real Estate Exchange of Ogden, Utah. At the same 
time Mr. Rucker and his wife were the owners of a 24-unit 
motel, a home and an apartment house in Tremonton, 
Utah, and at that time had listed this property with the 
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Chapman Realty Company, which company was a member 
of the multiple listing agreement group. (Tr .25-26) N e-
gotiations for a trade of this property for the dairy farm 
owned by respondents commenced in the month of March, 
1957, and Mr. Rucker looked over the respondents' proper-
ty (Tr. 27). 
On the 14th day of March, 1957, appellants and respon-
dents acting through the said Real Estate Exchange repre-
sented by a Mr. Petersen and Mr. Cheney, agents who acted 
for both parties, made, signed and delivered, each to the 
other, the original contract (Plaintiffs' Ex. A) upon which 
the respondents are now seeking a decree of specific per-
formance from the court, (Tr. 29, 32 & 35). This is desig-
nated as an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase. 
Under the terms of this contract it was agreed, that 
the appellants would exchange their 24-unit motel, one home, 
one apartment house located in Tremonton, Utah, together 
with all fixtures and equipment, all linens, bedspreads, 
blankets and all pertaining to the motel, apartment house 
and home, for the dairy farm together with all stock and 
equipment owned by the respondents as more particularly 
set out and listed on a listing card (Ex. X) all located three 
miles north of Brigham City, Utah. Each of the above 
properties was valued at $95,000,00. The respondents' 
property was encumbered by a $29,000.00 obligation and the 
appellants' property had a $19,000.00 mortgage on it. The 
difference of $10,000.00 was erased by an agreement be-
tween the parties, that plaintiffs would sign an agreement 
to pay the defendants an additional $10,000.00 as stated in 
the original contract (Ex. A). 
This original contract for the exchange of the property 
owned by the parties provides that the date of possession 
of. the property by the respective parties be on or before 
April 5th, 1957. 
All of the parties concerned with this transaction testi-
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fied consistently as to several inspections and viewings of 
the premises and as to their complete knowledge of the 
properties prior to the signing of the instrument. Mr. 
Rucker testified that prior to the signing of the first agree-
ment he had visited the Nielsen property and "I went over 
the cattle" (Tr.28); and he admitted that he knew that there 
was a chattel mortgage on the cattle (Tr. 38). He further 
testified that he counted the cows and was satisfied (Tr. 
198). Robert W. Rucker, son of the appellants, testified 
that prior to the time the original agreement was signed 
they went over to the Nielsen place and Mr. Nielsen showed 
them the lines of the place-the way it laid (Tr.291). Also, 
Max W. Rucker, another son of the appellants testified re-
garding the negotiations and explained the examination of 
the Nielsen property by his parents (Tr. 312-319). He also 
stated that his parents started packing things preparatory 
to moving after March 30th and that his father said that 
if everything went right he was figuring on moving (Tr. 
320). 
The respondent, Mr. Nielsen, testifed (Tr. 154) that he 
and Mr. Rucker had counted the cattle together, and when 
the latter was shown about the property he stated that he 
was acquainted with the land. Mr. Cheney, the agent, tes-
tified that he had counted the far.m machinery and the cattle 
with Mr. Rucker and his sons (Tr. 102). 
Tacit acknowledgment of the existence of the agree-
ment was further given by appellants when, some two weeks 
after it was signed, they sought to implement the original 
contract by entering into an agreement "to supplement 
part" of it. Had no original contract been in effect there 
would be nothing to supplement. The evidence at the trial 
reveals that subsequent to the signing of the original agree-
ment the respondents were experiencing difficulty in rais-
ing the necessary financing to carry out their part of the 
agreement and Mr. Rucker, the appellent, sought to assist 
them in this situation by proposing that the original agree-
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment be supplemented in order to expedite the performance 
of the agreement according to its terms. Mr. Rucker tes-
tified that he approached the agent, Mr. Petersen, himself 
and proposed the supplemental agreement as a method for 
carrying out the trade (Tr. 39-40), and that by doing so 
he agreed to do some of the financing himself and take a 
second mortgage on part of the property that Mr. Nielsen 
was going to receive in the trade. 
The record is clear, convincing and undisputed that the 
supplemental agreement was initiated by Mr. Rucker and 
that he was aware of the financial obligations imposed by it. 
Mr. Cheney testified (Tr. 110) that the first agreement was 
supplemented at the request of Mr. Rucker, who went to 
the real estate office and offered to assume the chattel mort-
gage in order to facilitate performance of the contract. Mr. 
Petersen testified that this second agreement was made out 
in his office and the respondents were not present at the 
time (Tr. 58) only Mr. Rucker was present and he was fully 
informed as to the financial aspects of the deal (Tr. 60-61) 
and he made no objection (Tr. 62, 140, 144). 
Mr. Nielsen testified that he had nothing to do with 
the preparation of the supplemental agreement (Tr. 157) 
and the appellant testified regarding it as follows (Tr. 206 .. 
207): 
"Q. Now I wanted to asked this to satisfy my mind. You 
went to Ogden on the 30th of March. It was you that 
hunted up Mr. Peterson in his office? 
A. I went to his office. 
Q. Why did you go down there that day? 
A. Well, I thought I was helping out the deal. 
Q. That's my understanding. 
A. I intended to trade if everything had been like they 
said it was. 
Q. And at that time he did - or that is, you decided on 
a method of financing it as you had Mr. Petersen make 
the supplemental agreement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's correct, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Peterson then wrote out what you would 
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do? 
A. Yes." 
The appellent further stated (Tr. 209-210): 
"Q. Now I have another notation here. You said to 
Mr. Mason, "I considered the original agreement ter-
minated. They said they couldn't get finance." When 
did you consider the original agreement, Ex A, ter-
minated? 
A. Well, I don't know whether it was Mr. Peterson or 
Cheney, that told me they couldn't get the finance, 
they'd have to quit. 
Q. When did you consider then that you'd have to quit? 
A. When they told me. 
Q. When was that? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Was that before your supple.mental agreement was 
made up? 
A. Before the second one was made up. 
Q. Yes. So rather than have it terminated, you went 
down to Ogden to try and work out something else to 
keep it revived? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that's when you worked out there terms under 
Ex. B?" 
Mrs. Rucker was also aware of the purpose of the supple-
mental agreement. She testified (Tr. 246): 
"Q. And you knew that from the time you had signed 
Ex. A that Mr. Nielsen was around trying to raise some 
money to pay off this chattel mortgage as agreed in 
Exhibit "A"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so on the 30th of March, as a new way of finan-
cing, you knew your husband had proposed this agree-
ment here shown as Exhibit "lB", as a supple.mental 
agreement? 
A. Yes, I knew the conditions. 
Q. Under that exhibit, why, you and your husband 
agreed to pay this chattel mortage? 
A. Yes, we did under the terms. 
Q. And after you two had agreed and signed, you knew 
that that was taken over to the Nielsens for their sig-
nature? 
A. I guess so." 
Thus the testimony clearly and indisputably shows that 
the supplemental agreement was entirely Mr. Rucker's own 
idea and that he did not consult with the Nielsens at all prior 
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to it$ .. preparation and execution. '.By this agreement the 
appellants, being fully cognizant of its terms, undertook to 
assume· the responsibility for the chattel mortgage on the 
Nielsen cattle. At the time this agreement was executed 
the chattel mortage was on record at the County Recorder's 
office in the Box Elder County Court House. Hannah Hil-
Iam, an employee of the County Recorder's Office testified 
that the chattel mortgage signed by the respondents in 
favor of the Bank of Utah was filed with the County Recor-
der of Box Elder County on December 26, 1956, (Tr .176) 
and had been on record there ever since (Tr. 177). 
Mr. Rucker testified that he knew of the chattel mort-
gage on the cattle (Tr. 181). In addition there is some tes-
timony that he consulted with the County Recorder's re-
cords prior to the time the supplemental instrument was 
executed (Tr. 200-201) and fully understood the terms of 
the chattel mortgage, but, after a short recess during_ :which 
he consulted with his counsel and Mrs. Rucker, he changed 
this testimony (Tr. 219). However, throughout his testi-
mony, Mr. Rucker indirectly admitted that there were no 
misrepresentations by showing knowledge or constructive 
knowledge prior to March 30th of all details of the financial 
aspects of the agreement (Tr. 196-201). 
Throughout the entire record there is consistent, un-
controverted and convincing testimony by all the parties 
that they considered the agreement to be binding and that 
it was the intent of all of them to trade their properties 
according to its terms. Mr. Rucker specifically testified 
"I intended to trade the motel, the home and apartment 
house" (Tr. 35); and gave his opinion as to the fairness 
of the trade as follows (Tr. 52): 
''Q. Now, Mr. Rucker, if I understand you right then, 
to sum this up, that this agreement together with the 
supplemental agreement that was signed on the 30th 
of March, 1957, if that agreement were carried out on 
both sides as written, you would make this trade? 
·A. If they was correct, yes, but they wasn't correct. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Well, we're here to see whether it's correct or not 
through this court. You wouldn't turn down a transfer 
or trade if it's exactly like the agreement? 
A. I intended to trade if everything had been as said. 
Reco.mmended. And it would have been a good, fair 
trade." 
As will be subsequently shown herein, the offers of 
performance made by the respondents are as represented in 
the agreement, but the appellants seek to avoid performance 
under its terms because of frivolous excuses and objections 
made after the institution of this action and which have no 
sound basis in fact or in law. 
That the appellants fully intend to make the trade in 
accordance with the agreement is further evidenced by the 
testimony of one of their tenants who stated that he had 
been informed by the Ruckers that they were moving out. 
This was toward the end of March, and the R uckers 
said that they were moving the next Saturday 
and that a .man from Harper Ward was going to 
come in (Tr. 89-92). Moreover, the evidence and testi-
mony as to their actions during this time corroborates the 
oral testimony of this intent by revealing the preparations 
made and contemplated by the appellants and the respon-
dents in order that the contract might be performed as 
anticipated. Appellants permitted an inventory to be 
made of the items which they intended to trade. Mr. Rucker 
testified that his wife gave the agent permission to count 
the items of personal property which would be traded with 
the motel. (Tr. 37). Mr. Rucker discussed with Mr. Nielsen 
the supplies on hand at the dairy farm and he testified that 
he told Mr. Nielsen he didn't want to fool with beet pulp, 
and told Nielsen he could sell it (Tr. 206). In addition, both 
parties made negotiations preparatory to carrying out the 
agreement. Mr. Rucker, the appellant, took so.me of his 
things over to the Nielsen property (Tr. 45). Mr. Cheney 
testified that he saw the fence posts and other things which 
Mr. Rucker had taken to the dairy farm (Tr. 104). On the 
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other hand, the respondents also commenced preparations 
for the exchange. They hired a truck and two men to help 
them move and contacted the former owner of the motel 
to employ him to assist them in taking care of it, (Tr. 152). 
Any implication that the parties did not intend to make 
the trade in accordance with the contract is clearly contra-
dicted by the record, either by direct testimony or by other 
facts and circumstances which are clearly shown. This 
contradiction of Mr. Rucker's testimony (Tr. 188-189) ·to 
the effect that he considered the original agreement termi-
nated because of the inability of Mr. Nielsen to finance his 
portion of the agreement is complete~y and convincingly 
demonstrated by his and others' testimony as to his actions 
and efforts to supply such financing by proposing and execu-
ting the supplemental agreement. 
It is respondents' contention that Exhibits "A" and 
"B" form the entire contract between the parties as to the 
exchange of the properties and only the detail of making 
up and executing the legal documents to carry out the agree-
ment and the physical exchange of the properties on the 
agreed date remained to be done, and the appellants admit 
that at the time they fully intended to trade (R. 52). It 
was further agreed verbally between the parties that an 
exchange would take place on Saturday and Sunday the 6th 
and 7th of April, 1957 (R. 153) and each of the parties 
actively commenced to carry the exchange into being b~ 
the appellants delivering certain personal property to re-:-
spondents' place (R. 45) and the respondents arranging 
for hired help and trucks with which to move the equipment 
(R. 152). The details of preparing the final instruments 
of title were left up to the joint agent of both parties. 
Everything was agreeable up to the 5th day of April, 1957, 
when the respondents went to the Rucker home and received 
instructions on how to keep the books, and the listing of 
renters (R. 155) and on the 6th of April Mr. Rucker was go-
ing to see how the cows were handled (R. 156). But about 
s· 
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the same time Mr. Rucker came back and picked up some 
posts he had left (R. 156) and the famous telegram of April 
6th was sent to Mr. Petersen in Ogden. It reads as follows: 
"BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH, APRIL 6th 11:30 P.M., 
HAROLD S. PETERSEN 
REALTORS OFFICE, 421 KEISEL A VENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 
RE: RUCKER NIELSEN DEAL, TIME HAS RUN 
OUT, NO FURTHER CONSIDERATION NECES-
SARY. WE GIVE NO FAVORS AND ASK NO 
FAVORS. 
GEORGE M. MASON." (Plaintiff's Ex. Y) 
It must be noted that this telegram makes no charge 
of failure of consideration or of performance or proffered 
performance on the part of the respondents. (See Tr. 48-49). 
A reading of it reveals no valid ground for rescission. Mr. 
Petersen, the agent who received it, testified, "I didn't 
know what the telegram meant. I couldn't understand it." 
(Tr. 84). 
Throughout the entire period the respondents have 
been willing and able to do anything necessary to perform 
their obligations under the agree.ment. Mr. Nielsen testi-
fied that they were ready and willing to move and exchange 
their farm for the property of the appellants on the basis 
set out in the agreement, but were barred from doing so 
by the actions of the appellants, and it was necessary to 
bring an action to seek the court to enforce the contract 
according to its terms. (Tr. 157). Furthermore, papers 
were prepared by the agents for the respondents' signatures 
to carry out their share of the agreement, and if these 
papers are not full and complete the plaintiffs are willing 
to sign any paper that the court might direct in order to 
perform under the contract according to its terms. (Tr.172). 
Evidence and testimony of the appellants' actions and 
attitudes on the other hand, reveals a complete refusal to 
recognize and perform their obligations under the agree-
ment. Transfer papers were prepared by the agents and 
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presented for their signature, but they refused to sign (Tr. 
50-51, 53, and 64). Although the agent stated that Mr. 
Rucker should have his attorney look the papers over, and 
if there was anything further which needed to be done by 
the agent, the latter would comply with the attorney's dir-
ections (Tr. 83-84), no such directions were issued to the 
agent, and there is no indication that the attorney attempted 
to determine the sufficiency of the papers submitted and 
direct that further instruments be prepared, or that those 
received be corrected in any way. Numerous and various 
excuses have been offered for the appellants' failure to 
perform and most of them were not advanced until trial. 
Most of the objections now raised to excuse the non-per-
formance could have been cured without trial had the 
appellants and their attorney raised them at the time the 
performance was offered. The only evidence of the basis 
for their failure to perform, other than the telegram 
hereinbefore discussed, is the testimony of Mr. Cheney re-
garding a conversation he had with Mr. Rucker on the 7th 
or 8th of April, (Tr. 105): 
"He said the deal was all off and he said, 'We can't go 
through with it because you've asked us to sign for the 
personal property in the apartment house.' We didn't 
ask him to sign the personal property. We asked him to 
sign the fixtures. The fixtures are not the furniture." 
As a consequence of the appellants' refusal to carry out 
the terms of their contract, this action in specific perfor-
mance was filed by the respondents and tried successfully 
in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT (PLAINTIFFS' 
EXHIBIT A), AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INSTRU-
MENT DATED MARCH 30, 1957 (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 
B) AND SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES HERETO, WAS NOT 
A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT, BUT CONSTITUTES A 
VALID, DEFINITE, COMPLETE AND CERTAIN CON-
TRACT, EXECUTORY IN NATURE, WIDCH IS BINDING 
ON ALL THE PARTIES. 
POINT II THE CHATIEL MORTGAGE WAS A MAT-
10 
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TER OF PUBLIC RECORD AND THE APPELLANT HAD 
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS 
CONTENTS, AND ITS ASSUMPTION BY HIM WAS A 
CREATURE OF HIS OWN MAKING. 
POINT III. THE COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF 
EQUITY, MAY COMPEL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE AGREEMENT (PLAINTIFFS' EXHitBITS A & B), 
AND THERE IS NO ADEQUATE REM..EDY AT LAW. 
POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HEREIN HAVE MADE 
EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO COl\1PLY STRICTLY 
WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT AND TO CAR-
RY ITS PERFORMANCE. 
POINT V. THE PURPORTED FAILURE ON THE PART 
OF THE AGENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO PREPARE 
CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS IN KEEPING WITH THE 
ORIGINAL CONTRACT DOES NOT AFFECT THE OBLI-
GATION OF THE PARTIES THEREUNDER, NOR DID IT 
INDUCE THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, AND 
ERRORS COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AT ANY 
TIME TO COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, 
IF APPELLANTS HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT (PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXIDBIT A) AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE IN-
STRUMENT DATED MARCH 30, 1957, (PLAIN-
TIFF'S EXHIBIT B), and SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES 
HERETO, WAS NOT A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT, 
BUT CONSTITUTES A VALID, DEFINITE, COMPLETE 
AND CERTAIN CONTRACT EXECUTORY IN NATURE, 
WHICH IS BINDING ON ALL THE PARTIES. 
In order to justify a decree for specific performance 
it is first necessary to establish the existence of a valid con-
tract. American Jurisprudence, 1Volume 49, Section 15, 
Page 24, states the general rule in the following language: 
"While it is universally recognized that equitable relief 
by way of specific performance does not follow as a 
matter of course by establishing the existence and val-
idity of the contract the performance of which is 
sought, the existence of a valid contract is essential, 
and .many of the cases in which the jurisdiction of a 
court of equity, or of a court exercising equity powers, 
is invoked to obtain a specific enforcement of a con-
tract do not turn so much upon rules governing the 
exercise of those equitable power as they do upon the 
underlying and fundamental questions as to the exist-
11 
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ence or nonexistence of a legal contract. In order for 
equity to decree specific performance, it is necessary 
that there be in existence and in effect a contract valid 
at law and binding upon the party against whom 
performance is sought for specific performance is 
never applicable where there is no obligation to per-
form ... " 
Corpus Juris Secondum sets out the necessary ingredi-
ents to the establishment of a valid contract as (1) parties 
competent to contract, (2) subject matter, (3) a legal con-
sideration, (4) mutuality of agreement and (5) mutuality 
of consideration. (17C.J.S.310) By applying this test it 
becomes apparent that all of the necessary ingredients 
are present in the agreement in the instant 
case. All parties to the agreement were competent, the 
properties to be exchanged (subject matter) are described 
with reasonable certainty, the mutual promises to exchange 
them constitutes adequate consideration, and there is mu-
tuality as to both agreement and consideration. 
In this instance we are dealing with one agreement en-
tered into between the parties for the exchange of their 
respective properties. This is the Earnest Money Receipt 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). This agreement was subsequent-
ly supplemented by the instrument dated March 30, 1957 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit B), but essentially the two together 
constitute the one contract with which we are concerned. 
It must be remembered that all of the witnesses, including 
both of the defendants, testified specifically that at the 
time they executed this contract it was their intention to 
trade their properties. Furthermore a readng of the in-
strument itself reveals that one purpose and intent solely 
There is nothing in its language from which it can be im-
plied that this was merely an agreement to make and exe-
cute another future agreement of exchange. The parties 
contemplated the immediate exchange of their realty and 
expressed this purpose in writing, and signed the instru-
ment to the effect on March 14, 1957, setting on or before 
April 5, 1957, as the date of the physical exchange of their 
12 
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properties. Although several separate documents were re-
ceived in evidence there is only one contract consisting of 
plaintiffs' exhibit A, as supplemented by plaintiff's exhibit 
B which covers the entire transaction. All the other docu-
ments merely constitute a part of the plaintiffs' tendered 
performance, and were executed for the purpose of carrying 
out the intent of the parties as expressed in the original 
contract. Contrary to defendants' contention, this contract 
was not tentative, but upon its signing and delivery it con-
stituted a definite, certaln and complete agreement be-
tween the parties to exchange their properties. It was a 
complete contract, executory in nature, which necessarily 
contemplated certain further acts to be performed and in-
struments to be signed in order to effectuate completion 
of the performance of its terms. 
It is clear that the parties did not contemplate the exe-
cution of any other instrument to set out their contract, al-
though the performance of the agreement did call for the 
execution of other documents in order to effect a transfer 
of title to the properties. In this connection the California 
case of Mann vs. Mueller, 295 P. 2d 42, 140 C. A. 2d 481, is 
directly in point. The Court there held: 
"Where the parties, as in the instant action, have 
agreed in writing upon the essential terms of their 
contract (for the exchange of realty), even though 
several more formal instruments are to be prepared 
and signed later, the written agremeent which they 
have already signed is a binding contract. When one 
party refuses to execute the more for.mal instruments 
intended, the other party has a right to rely upon the 
contract already expressed in writing. ·Vavina v. 
Smith, 25 Cal. 2d 501, 504, 154 P. 2d 681." 
Concededly, the contract anticipated subsequent actions 
on the part of the parties to carry out the terms of this 
contract, but these acts were to be the performance agreed 
to by the parties in the original contract. They contem-
plated that mortgages, bills of sale, deeds and other instru-
ments would have to be signed and executed pursuant to 
13 
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the original contract, but these documents were not to be 
considered the major agreement, they were minor and sub-
sidiary accessories to the primary contract and none of 
them represents the complete whole of the agreement. 
This is represented only by the original primary agreement. 
It is the only instrument, either made or contemplated, 
which includes in definite terms the intent of the parties 
to exchange their properties and the terms upon which such 
an exchange was to be made. This instrument, by its na-
ture, anticipated performance of future acts by both parties. 
It was therefore, not a tentative agreement as claimed by 
the appellants, but was a complete executory contract. "An 
executory contract is one in which a party binds himself to 
do or not to do a particular thing in the future. An exe-
cutory contract conveys a chose in action; an executed con-
tract, a chose in possession." (17 C.J.S. 326; Lewis v. Lam-
bros, Montana, 194 Pac. 152). 
Appellants quote 81 Corpus Juris Secondum Sec. 33, 
page 488, which states: 
"Except where uncertainty and ambiguity has been re-
moved or cured by the parties a court of equity will not 
decree specific performance of a contract for the sale, 
exchange or conveyance of land, or an interest therein, 
unless the contract designates or describes the land 
with definiteness and certainty or furnishes or refers 
to means or data by which it can be identified and loca-
ted with certainty by the aid of admissable extrinstic 
evidence, such as public records, maps or other docu-
ments ..... " 
This is certainly a case where the parties themselves 
have cured any uncertainty about the property by viewing 
it, by looking at it, by inspecting, by counting the livestock, 
machinery and equipment. That there is nothing in the 
record that could be construed as evidence to the effect 
that neither of the parties knew what the other was tore-
ceive, in exchange for the others' property, after Exhibits 
A and B had been executed. But, more important than 
that, the quotation relied upon by the appellants is taken 
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from context and does not state the applicable rule in its 
entirety. The paragraph immediately preceding that quot-
ed in appellants' brief and the first and primary rule stated 
in Section 33 of the quoted text is as follows: 
"Before a contract will be specifically enforced it must 
be reasonably definite and certain as to its subject mat-
ter; the subject matter must be, and it is sufficient 
if it is, described so that it may be aided and made 
definite by such extrinsic evidence as is admissable for 
such purpose." 
One of the cases cited in the footnote to this section is 
directly in point. In the case of Thompson v. Walsh, 172 
P.2d 745, (California) the court stated: 
" . . . . The escrow holder was the agent of the plain-
tiffs as well as of the defendants for the consummation 
of the sale and was authorized to receive from defen-
dants an acceptance of plaintiffs' offer. It was not ne-
cessary that plaintiffs' instructions, D, also, should 
contain a description of the personal property, nor was 
it necessary that defendants' acceptance contain such 
description. Plaintiffs' offer was as much a part of 
the agreement as were the escrow instructions, and 
could be looked to for a description of the property 
which was to be the subject of the bill of sale and the 
inventory .... " 
The Utah Supreme Court in Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. vs. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 6 Utah 2d 98, held that the 
intent of the parties to contract should be ascertained 
first from the four corners of the instrument itself, second 
from other contemporaneous writings concerning the same 
subject matter, and third from extrinsic parol evidence of 
the intentions. It has also been held that the mutual in-
tention of the parties as exhibited by their language, acts 
and conduct governs in construing a contract. Crocker v. 
McFadden, (Calif.) 307 P2d. 429. In the instant case, all 
of the witnesses, including the two appellants, testified 
that at the time the agreement was signed it was their 
intention to trade their properties. In the light of these 
declarations, the only possible construction which can be 
placed upon the instrument is that it was a complete and 
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final agreement to carry out that intent. The evidence of 
the parties' activities during and immediately after the con-
tract was signed also supports this construction. 
In the instant case the contract specifically provides 
that the respondents were to trade "The dairy farm owned 
by Glen F. Nielsen and wife AltaR. Nielsen, together with 
all stock and equipment as listed on listing card, located at 
three miles north of Brigham City, Utah". Looking to the 
listing card, defendants' exhibit X, the acreage of the dairy 
farm is stated to be 110 acres and the buildings, cattle and 
other ite.ms are described. Thus, the contract itself specifi-
cally includes and refers to another document which, when 
read together with the contract, renders its meaning clear 
and certain as to the property contemplated by the parties 
and therefore the rule in the above quoted case is doubly 
applicable. 
The minor errors made by the parties' mutual agent in 
tendering performance of the contract do not affect the 
basic agreement of the parties, about which there is no con-
fusion. These errors will be discussed in a subsequent por-
tion of this brief. 
POINT II. THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE WAS A MAT-
TER OF PUBLIC RECORD AND THE APPELLANT HAD 
ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS 
CONTENTS, AND ITS ASSUMPTION BY HIM WAS A 
CREATURE OF HIS OWN MAKING. 
The evidence at the trial reveals that subsequent to the 
signing of the original agreement the appellant, Mr. Rucker, 
approached the real estate agent and enlisted his aid in ex-
pediting the performance of the agreement according to its 
terms. Mr. Rucker made a trip to Ogden to the agent's of-
fice for this purpose. Pursuant to Mr. Rucker's desire and 
in his presence and at that time unbeknown to the respond-
ents, the agent prepared the so-called supplemental agree-
ment. The appellants, fully cognizant of its terms, signed 
this agreement and thereby undertook to assume the respon-
sibility for the chattel mortgage on the Nielson cattle. At 
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the time the appellants executed this instrument the chat-
tel mortgage was on record at the Box Elder County Court 
House and the officers of the bank which held this mort-
gage were readily available for consultation and informa-
tion. In addition, there is some testimony in the record that 
Mr. Rucker consulted the records at the Court House prior 
to the time the March 30th instrument was executed, but 
this was later denied by him, after a short recess during the 
trial (Tr. 207, 216, 219). The testimony shows that this 
supplemental agreement was entirely Mr. Rucker's own 
idea and that he did not consult with the Nielson's at all 
prior to its preparation and execution. Also, it .must be 
remembered that these parties are mature individuals, who 
had at least a basic knowledge concerning transactions in 
real estate having dealt in such matters previously and they 
should have understood the effect of their signatures when 
freely and voluntarily placed upon written instruments. 
In these circumstances, the conclusion is inescapable that 
Mr. Rucker knew or reasonably should have known the ex-
tent to which he would be bound by the agreement he signed. 
However, conceding for purposes of argument only, 
that there was a misunderstanding between the parties as 
to the terms of the chattel mortgage which the appellants 
subsequently agreed to assume, respondents should not be 
held accountable for the appellants' misunderstanding. 
Certain admitted facts .must be remembered in this connec-
tion. First: The respondents voluntarily and readily re-
vealed that the title to the cattle was encumbered by a chat-
tel mortgage. Second: The assumption of the chattel 
mortgage by the appellants was entirely voluntary and came 
about as a result of action initiated solely by Mr. Rucker. 
Third: The mortgage was on record at the Box Elder 
County Court House and had been a matter of record since 
December 26, 1956, over three months prior to the time the 
defendants agreed to assume it. Fourth: The appellants 
had conferred with the officers of the Bank of Utah, the 
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holder of the chattel mortgage, prior to the time they sign-
ed the subsidiary agree.ment in which they undertook to 
assume this obligation. Thus, no misrepresentations were, 
or could have been, made to them. The due date of the 
chattel mortgage and its terms were fully revealed. The 
opportunity to acquaint themselves with these terms was 
readily accessible to the appellants. Ordinary prudence 
and caution would dictate that they use reasonable dili-
gence to discover the provisions of the mortgage, which 
were on record for all the world to see, prior to the time they 
2.greed to assume it. Their failure, if any, to acquire actual 
knowledge of its terms should not be charged against the 
respondents who had openly, voluntarily and readily im-
parted the information that their title to the cattle was en-
cumbered. It is unnecessary that actual knowledge of the 
mortgage terms on the part of the appellants be shown. 
Notice of the mortgage should be sufficient. At least, it is 
obvious that circumstances were known to the appellants 
which should have stimulated them to inquiry, when the 
means of such inquiry were so readily accessible. It is con-
ceded that notice and knowledge are not, in law, always 
synonymous. However, proof of certain circumstances is 
generally sufficient to warrant a presumption that a person 
has knowledge, or the means of access to the needed infor-
mation, and this is the equivalent of actual knowledge. 
The presence of such circumstances is apparent in this case 
and respondents contend that they are sufficient to justify 
a finding of knowledge on the part of the appellants. At 
least, in the face of all these facts and circumstances, ap-
pellants allegations of any .misrepresentation on the part of 
the respondents, or misunderstanding on the part of them-
selves, can not be supported. 
POINT III. THE COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF 
EQUIY, MAY COMPEL SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE AGREEMENTS (PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBITS A & B) 
AND THERE IS NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. 
It is well recognized that, as a part of the appropriate 
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and acknowledged jurisdiction of a court of equity, specific 
performance of a contract to convey real property has been 
enforced from the earliest decisions, although the party may 
have, in most cases, another remedy by an action at law 
upon the agreement. Cummings vs. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 
129 Pac. 619. When either party to a contract for the sale 
of land has failed in his obligation, the other is entitled to 
the alternative remedy of specific performance in equity, 
or damage at law. Thompson, Real Property Volume 8, 
Section 4630. Inasmuch as every suit for specific perform-
ance must necessarily be determined largely on its own spe-
cial facts, the rules governing the case must be applied with 
more or less flexibility. 
Respondents are aware that certainty and completeness 
of the contract are prerequisites of an action for a decree of 
specific performance. See Thompson, supra, Section 4637. 
In this case the instrument signed by the parties clearly ex-
presses their intent and decision to trade their properties, 
and the descriptions of such properties are sufficiently clear. 
The terms upon which the exchange was to be made are 
expressed, and a definite date for possession was agreed 
upon, and the contract was certain as to its terms. By its 
execution the parties clearly and definitely expressed their 
intent to exchange their respective realty, and to later work 
out such details, perform such acts, and sign such further 
instruments as would be necessary to fully effectuate the 
exchange in accordance with their original expressed intent. 
The general rule states that it is not essential that the 
contract be specific in all its terms, and in this instance the 
nature of the transaction between the parties necessarily 
required that subsequent documents such as assignments of 
contracts and escrow agreements, warranty deeds, bills of 
sale, mortgages and promissory notes be executed by the 
parties in order to carry out the agreed intent and terms as 
set out in the primary contract. The failure of the pri-
mary contract to recite all of the specific terms, details and 
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conditions of each of the contemplated minor documents 
does not affect its own validity. 
While it is true that the language used in the contract 
is not as apt as it might have been, its meaning is reason-
ably clear and was well understood by the parties to the 
agreement. In this connection a leading Utah case on the 
subject of specific performance is pertinent. In Cummings 
vs. Nielsen, supra, decided by the Supreme Court in 1913 
the lower court had heard plaintiffs' evidence in an action 
for specific performance of a contract and had granted a 
nonsuit and entered a judgment dismissing the action. On 
appeal the Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so laid 
down certain rules and principles governing such actions. 
The Court stated: 
"In determining the meaning that should be given to 
the language used in an agreement in order to ascertain 
the intention of the parties, all words or terms used 
must be given their ordinary and usual effect, when 
considered in the light of the subject matter and the 
nature ·of the agreement ..... 
" .... It is a cardinal rule of construction that that 
which is implied is always as much a part of any writ-
ing as that which is expressed. 
"It is elementary that in equity that is certain which 
can be made certain." 
With the foregiing principles in mind a thorough exam-
ination of the contract in the present cast leads us to but one 
conclusion: That a valid, complete and certain contract to 
exchange their properties was entered into between the par-
ties, and further, that the lower court's action in decreeing 
specific performance was proper. 
Nor can there be any doubt that there is sufficient 
consideration to support the contract. Thompson, supra, 
Section 4639, states: 
"A contract to be specifically enforced must be suppor-
ted by a valuable consideration, but the mutual promis-
es of each party, as in a contract to exchange real es-
tate, may be sufficient consideration to support an ac-
tion for specific performance." 
Here, the parties clearly intended to exchange their 
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properties. Each of them, without any undue influence, 
voluntarily signed the contract of which specific perform-
ance is now sought. Subsequent disagreements, or misun-
derstandings, if any, as to the minor details which had to 
be worked out in subsequent minor instruments in order to 
effect complete performance of the contract should not be 
allowed to affect retroactively the promises clearly pro-
nounced in the primary understanding which existed be-
tween the parties, and which had previously been reduced to 
writing and signed and delivered by them. The contract is 
complete and valid and constitutes a clear statement of the 
desire and decision of th~ parties to exchange their respec-
tive properties, each valued at $95,000.00. 
The .modern trend in suits for specific performance 
evidences a tendency on the part of courts to accept estab-
lished rules of equity as binding upon them, even though 
the language used in many of the cases expresses their de-
cisions in such terms that would lead one to presume that 
it was a discretionary action. American Jurisprudence 
Volume 49, Seeton 9, Page 17, expresses this modern view 
in the following language: 
"Terms indicating a discretion on the part of the court 
in decreeing specific performance were originally used 
apparently to distinguish equitable relief from the re-
lief obtainable in an action at law for breach of con-
. tract, but the grounds upon which the courts were 
' moved to grant relief by way of specific performance 
have gradually crystallized into rules binding upon the 
courts and controlling their discretion, until at the 
present time these rules and principles have become so 
well settled as to .make the use of the term 'discretion' 
with regard to the granting of a decree of specific per-
formance often somewhat misleading. This is true 
even when the terms 'sound' and 'judicial' discretion 
are used to indicate a discretion controlled by or sub-
ject to equitable rules granting or refusing relief in 
actions for specific performance of contracts. As has 
been said, the remedy of specific performance is gov-
erned by the same general rules which control the ad-
ministration of other equitable remedies. As a gener-
al rule it .may be said that when the party seeking 
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specific performance of a contract establishes the ex-
istence of a valid binding contract which is definite and 
certain in its terms and contains the requisite of mu-
tuality of obligation and is one which is free from un-
fairness, fraud, or overreaching, and enforceable with-
out injustice upon the party against whom enforcement 
is sought, the court will, when the remedy at law for 
the breach of such contract is inadequate, and the en-
forcement of specific performance will not be inequit-
able, oppressive, or unconscionable, or result in undue 
hardship, grant a decree of specific performance as a 
matter of course or right. Rights of the plaintiff to 
such relief where he makes a case coming within these 
equitable rules, or the right of the defendant to have 
the plaintiff remitted to his action at law if his case is 
not brought within these equitable rules, is not de-
pendent upon any exercise of discretionary power on the 
part of the court in the literal sense of the term." 
Accordingly, since the contract under consideration 
herein reasonably meets all the conditions of a valid con-
tract, and clearly expresses the intent of the parties, was 
not obtained through fraud, and no hardship would be im-
posed since its performance would merely accomplish what 
was intended by both parties, the court, by applying the 
settled principles governing suits for specific performance 
should exercise its powers of equity and grant the relief 
sought by the respondents. 
In this instance, little argument to the effect that there 
is no adequate remedy it law, is necessary. The contract 
involves the exchange of certain pieces of real property, 
and where that type of property is involved courts, almost 
universally, consider that money damages will not compen-
sate for the breach. 1\merican Jurisprudence, Volume 49, 
page 107 states the rule in the followng language (Sec. 92) : 
"The subject matter most commonly involved in actions 
for specific performance is that of contracts for the sale 
of land or which otherwise involve interest in real es-
tate. The reason for this lies not so much in any ten-
dency of equity to distinguish between kinds of proper-
ty as in the fact that the remedy at law is less likely 
to be adequate in the case of land than in the case of 
other property, for if the proper elements of jurisdic-
tion are present, equity impartially grants specific per-
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formance of .any contract, regardless of whether it in-
volves real or personal property. The most important 
aspect of land, in so far as equity jurisdiction for spe-
cific performance is concerned, is that no piece of land 
has its counterpart anywhere else, and is impossible 
of duplication by the expenditure of any amount of 
money. 
"The courts assume, in almost every case in which ac~ 
tion is brought to enforce specific performance of a-
co1;1tract for the sale of land or an interest therein, that 
money damages do not constitute an adequate remedy 
for the breach of such a contract, and take jurisdiction 
without the necessity of an actual showing that this is 
the case ..... " 
Applying these principles to the instant case, it is the 
contention of the plaintiffs that the contract herein, being 
one involving real property, is a proper instrument upon 
which a court of equity should exercise its powers and grant 
specific performance, and that in such a case there is no 
necessity to show affirmatively that an action for damages. 
at law would be inadequate. 
POINT IV. RESPONDENTS HEREIN HAVE MADE: 
EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT TO COMPLY STRICTLY 
WITH THE TERMS OF 'rHE CONT'RACT AND TO CAR-
RY OUT ITS PERFORMANCE. 
There can be no serious question about the efforts 
which respondents have made to perform their obligations 
under the contract. They executed all the documents pre-
sented to the.m by the agents, to carry out their portion of 
the contract and left these papers with the Real Estate Ex-
change in Ogden, Utah, for delivery to the appellants. 
They also delivered the abstract of title to the dairy farm· 
to the agent in Ogden, where it was available for the ap-. 
pellants' examination. At all times they have stood in. 
readiness to effect a physical exchange of the possession of 
the properties. Their institution of this suit for specific 
performance of the contract is but further evidence of their 
willingness and desire to conform to its terms. Any fail-
ure to complete the performance of the contract has been 
due solely to the actions of the appellants. 
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The respondents have at all times been ready and will-
ing to perform the obligations assumed by them when they 
entered into the contract with the appellants. They still 
remain ready and willing to perform in accordance with the 
ter.ms of the decree of the lower court, and so stated in open 
court (Tr. 158-159): 
"Q. Are you willing to execute any instrument 
that might be necessary in the opinion of a court of 
equity to complete the transfer according to the terms 
of the agreement entered into? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you would like the same paper entered in your 
behalf? 
A: Yes." 
POINT V. THE PURPORTED FAILURE ON THE PART 
OF THE AGENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO PREPARE CER-
TAIN INSTRUMENTS IN KEEPING WITH THE ORIGIN-
AL CONTRAC'l1 DOES NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATION 
OF THE PARTIES THEREUNDER, NOR DID IT INDUCE 
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, AND ERRORS 
COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED AT ANY TIME TO 
COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, IF APPEL-
LANTS HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
Apellants point to a disparity between the total acre-
age of the dairy farm as anticipated in the contract and that 
in the performance tendered by the respondents through 
their mutual agent. Because of this they assert that their 
refusal to live up to their obligations under the contract 
is justified. This is a minor matter relating to one of the 
details of performance of the valid contract, and does not 
affect its original validity nor excuse non-performance on 
the part of the appellants. Respondents have continually 
maintained and testified that they are ready, willing and 
able to perform whatever acts are necessary to complete 
their performance of the contract. Any discrepancies or 
omissions in their tendered perfomance could and would 
have been corrected by the mutual agent had apellants dealt 
with them in good faith. In this connection it should also 
be remembered that the parties viewed the premises and 
properties thereon, and there was a complete understanding 
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and agreement as to the amount, extent and type of realty 
and personal property intended to be transferred. Any cor-
rection necessay to bring performance within the intent 
and meaning of the contract could have been easily reme-
died. It must be noted that the respondents were prohibi-
ted from carrying out their portion of the agreement in a 
proper manner by the appellants' attempted repudiation 
and failure to live up to their obligations. Had appellants 
notified their own agent of this minor inadvertant error, 
the papers could have been readily corrected. 
Appellants also seek to avoid the obligations imposed 
upon them under the contract by claiming that their non-
performance is excused because the deed from the respon-
dents to the appellants reserves one-half >Of all oil, gas and 
mineral rights (plaintiffs' exhibit F.) An immediate an-
swer to this contention is that the appellants failed t'O in-
clude such an issue in their pleadings. Moreover, appel-
lants' deed to the respondents (plaintiffs' exhibits M and 
N) included similar provisions. But, most important, and 
this considerati>Dn affects the reservation of these rights 
and other matter previously discussed, appellants made no 
objection to these matters at the time the performance was 
tendered or in ~ reasonable time thereafter, nor did they 
at any time seek to have the agent revise or correct any of 
the instruments or tell anyone concerned the nature of. the 
deficiencies or discrepancies upon which they now base their 
objections. It is clear that the appellants did not base their 
attempted rescission of the contract upon any of the 
grounds now advanced since no one was informed of their 
objections. They should not be allowed to assert these 
matters after trial has commenced. 
Pertinent to this issue is the case of McAdam v. Leak 
(Kansas) 208 Pac. 569, in which the court said: 
"It is contended that the minds of the parties did not 
meet upon all the essential matters of the contract be-
cause nothing had been said as to when and where the 
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purchase price was to be paid. In that situation the 
defendant could have insisted upon receiving it at her 
residence in exchange for the deed as soon as a reason-
able time had elapsed fo:r an examination of the ab-
stract. She did not break off the deal, however, be-
cause of any question of time or place of payment or of 
delivery of the abstract or deed, but upon the ground 
that the price was too low." 
And in Le Marine! v. ;Bach, 196 Pac. 22, the supreme 
court of Washington upheld a decree of specific perform-
ance of a contract for the exchange of property. The 
court said: 
"The tender of performance made on the part of re-
spondents included an assignment of the contract which 
they held from one Taylor and consent on Taylor's part 
to the assignment as well as tender of the $6000 which 
respondents were to pay the appellants. The appell-
ants did not refuse to perform because the contract 
tendered was not such as they thought they were en-
titled to, but they based their claim in the first in-
stance upon the alleged fact that the contract had 
been induced by fraud. If the court should be of the 
view that the contract to be tendered was different 
from that offered by the respondents, it would not 
follow that the action would absolutely fail for this 
reason, because, this being an equity action, the par-
ties would undoubtedly be given the privilege of tender-
ing such a contract as the court considered they were 
under obligation to do." 
Respondents are of the opinion that the appellants are 
now confusng "completed contract" with "completed per-
formance of the contract." These objections relate to per-
formance, and not to any fatal defects in the contract it-
self. Appellants have failed to allege, or prove, what es-
sential elements of a valid contract have been omitted from 
the agreement signed by the parties, but both appellants 
testified as to their intent. The parties here adapted a 
printed from to their use. This form is designated as an 
Earnest Money Receipt and similar instruments have pre-
vously been considered by the Utah Supreme Court and 
their validity upheld. In Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 
299 P2d 1114, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court 
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and upheld the validity of an earnest money receipt, there-
by decreeing payment of a brokers commission according to 
the terms of the contract. See also Continental Bank & 
Trust Company v. Stewart, 291 P.2d 890, 4 Utah 2d 228, 
and Gaddis Investment Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 
278 Pd2 284. 
As a final argument against the objections made tore-
spondents' tender of performance as advanced by appell-
ants, it should be noted that all necessary deeds and bills 
of sale could have been reformed to comply with the contract 
and the intent of the parties. See Nordfors v. Knight, 90 
Utah 114, 60 P2d 1115; Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116 
307 P2d 620, and cases cited therein. 
CROSS APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The contract (exhibit A) provided for the payment of 
reasonable attorney's fees to enforce the same. The only 
evidence covering reasonable attorneys fees was $3000.00 
to $3500.00. 
STATMENT OF POINTS: 
POINT I: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS FEES FOR 
THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THEIR ATI'ORNEYS IN 
THE SUM OF $3500.00 PURSUANT TO THE TESTIMONY 
PRODUCED AT SAID HEARING, AS BEING THE REAS-
ONABLE SUM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES FOR LITIGAT-
ING A TRANSACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF A CONTRACT DECLARED BY THE PARTIES TO 
INVOLVE PROPERTIES OF A VALUE OF $95,000.00 FOR 
EACH OF SAID PROPERTIES. 
POINT II: THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE 
RIGHT TO ASSESS SUCH SUM AS AND FOR ATTOR-
NEYS FEES ON APPEAL, AS IS !EQUITABLE THE 
CONTRACT RELIED UPON AND SIGNED BY 'I'HE 
PARTIES PROVIDED FOR A REASONABLE ATTOR~ 
NEYS FEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING SAID 
CONTRACT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEYS FEES FOR 
THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THEIR ATTORNEYS IN 
THE SUM OF $3500.00 PURSUANT TO THE TESTIMONY 
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PRODUCED AT SAID HEARING, AS BEING THE REAS-
ONABLE SUM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES FOR LITIGAT-
ING A TRANSACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF A CONTRACT DECLARED BY THE PARTIES TO 
INVOLVE PROPERTIES OF A VALUE OF $95,000.00 
FOR EACH OF SAID PROPERTIES. 
That the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the 
court below is clearly insufficient is established by the re-
cord. The only evidence regarding such fees is the testi-
mony of Mr. 0. Dee Lund who was qualified as an expert 
witness on this subject. After reviewing the nature of the 
case and the work involved in interviewing witnesses, exam-
ining documents, and researching legal authorities, he tes-
tified that a reasonable attorneys fee in a case such as this 
would be between $3000.00 and $3500.00 (Tr. 96-98). 
In addition to this uncontroverted testimony as to at-
torneys fees, the inadequacy of the fees allowed by the court 
is further demonstrated when compared with the real estate 
broker's commission. This was a transaction involving the 
trade of two properties, each of a value of $95,000.00. On 
exchange of the properties each of the parties had agreed 
to pay the real estate agent five (5) per cent to perfect the 
exchange. 
Even the attorney for the defense l\ir. Mason agreed 
that the amount of $3500.00 was reasonable for the legal 
services performed. He stated (Tr. 435): 
"Mr. Mason: Well we're still on these findings of fact. 
On the basis of the evidence, we take great issue with 
the provisions of paragraph nine and ten, and we take 
issue with paragraph eleven. 
Mr. Mann: You mean you want to pay us more attor-
ney's fees? 
Mr. Mason: Mr. Mann, if you're entitled to any, I wish 
the court would have given you the whole $3500.00 
Don't put that in the record. 
The Court: It's in there. 
Mr. Mann: Thanks George. That will help on appeal. 
Mr. Mason: That's all right. That's all right. 
The contract in this case provides: 
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms 
and conditions specified above, and, ... (etc.,) If either 
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party fails so to do, he agrees to pay all expenses of 
enforcing this agreement, or of any right, arising out 
of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee." 
We, as members of the Bar, feel that our services 
are just as important as any real estate agent's services. 
If a real estate agent could act for both parties and draw 
five (5) per cent commission on $95,000.00 for each, we 
certainly feel that an attorney going to court to enforce that 
agreement would at least be entitled to $3500.00, as com-
pared with $9500.00 for a real estate agent's services. We 
feel that the $600.00 allowed by the court was almost an 
insult to the ability of a lawyer. It might have had some 
effect to stop an appeal, but that consideration should not be 
involved in the assessment of a fair and reasonable fee. 
We believe that the Supreme Court should direct that the 
attorneys fees be in keeping with the only testimony pre-
sented to the Court: to-wit, $3500.00. 
POINT II: THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE 
RIGHT TO ASSESS SUCH SUM AS AND FOR ATTOR-
NEYS FEES ON APPEAL, AS IS EQUITABLE, THE 
CONTRACT RELIED UPON AND SIGNED BY THE PAR-
TIES PROVIDED FOR A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS 
FEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING SAID CON-
TRACT. 
If the respondents are entitled to prevail on this appeal 
to the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court should fix 
reasonable attorneys fees for defending this matter before 
this Court on appeal. The amount thereof should rest in 
the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, as no evidence 
at this stage can be offered. 
We earnestly request that if the respondents prevail 
on their theory of the case that they also have fixed by this 
Court the reasonable value of their s-ervices on appeal, and 
that the District Court be directed to have it included as 
part of its judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the respondents contend: 
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1. That the original agreement ( exhrbit A) in con-
nection with the supplemental agreement (exhibit B) is the 
complete contract between the parties; is executory in na-
ture; was not a mere tentative agreement, but constituted a 
definite, certain, and complete expression of the intent of 
the parties to exchange their properties and clearly reflects 
the basic transaction contemplated by them. 
2. That the parties involved are local parties, have 
passed each other's propery over periods of years; are ma-
ture individuals with a background of trading experience 
and knew what they were doing; took a great deal of time 
to investigate each and every angle of the transatction. It 
was not a rna tter of trading two properties of $95,000.00 
each, without knowing every detail involved and upon the 
execution and delivery of the original contract and supple-
mental contract (Exhibits A & B) the parties were bound 
by its terms and since it deals with the exchange of specific 
parcels of real property it is a proper instrument upon which 
the court may exercise its equitable powers and grant spe-
cific performance, there being no adequate remedy at law. 
3. That the respondents have done everything reas-
onably possible to perform their obligation under the eon-
tract. 
4. That the instruments required to complete the 
transaction and place each of the parties into the posses-
sion of said properties, can be made up and executed by 
each under the direction of the court. 
5. That the contract provides for the payment of at-
torneys fees for enforcing the same and respondents are 
entitled to a reasonable attorneys fee to-wit: The sum of 
$3500.00 for the hearing in the District Court, and for reas-
onable attorneys fees to be fixed by the Supreme Court 
upon defending this matter on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G. Mann 
Attorney for respondents 
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